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CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-SCOPE OF
RULE 3-TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CONFLICT BETWEEN
RULE 3 AND STATE TOLLING STATUTE-The United States Supreme

Court has determined that in a federal diversity action, Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not broad enough to displace an
integral state tolling provision for purposes of tolling the state statute
of limitations.
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
On August 22, 1975, Fred N. Walker, an Oklahoma resident, suffered
permanent injuries when a nail which he was pounding, shattered and
struck him in the eye.' Walker brought suit against the manufacturer,
Armco Steel, in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, alleging negligence in manufacture and design.'
Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship because Walker was
a resident of Oklahoma and Armco was a corporation with its principal
place of business outside of Oklahoma.' On August 19, 1977, the complaint was filed and the summons was issued.' Service of process on
1. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1134 (10th Cir. 1979), affd, 446 U.S.
740 (1980).
2. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 452 F. Supp. 243, 243 (W.D. Okla. 1978), affd, 592
F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
3. 446 U.S. at 741-42. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), which provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs and is between(1) citizens of different states ....
(c) For the purposes of this section... a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business ....

Id.
4. 452 F. Supp. at 243. See 446 U.S. at 472. The complaint was filed and the summons was issued according to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Civ.
P. 3. See 452 F. Supp. at 243-44.
The purpose of Rule 3 is set out in the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 3 which
state:
This rule provides that the first step in an action is the filing of the complaint.
Under Rule 4(a) this is to be followed forthwith by issuance of a summons and its
delivery to an officer for service. Other rules providing for dismissal for failure to
prosecute suggest a method available to attack unreasonable delay in prosecuting
an action after it has been commenced.
FED. R. Civ. P. 3. 28 U.S.C. app. R. 3 (1976), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, note
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the defendant's authorized service agent was not effectuated until
December 1, 1977.1 On January 5, 1978, Armco filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint because the action was barred by the applicable
Oklahoma statute of limitations.' The defendant conceded that the complaint had been filed within the two-year statute of limitations, but
noted that state law did not allow commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations until service had been made on the
defendant.7 The filing of the complaint within the limitations period
would have commenced the action from the filing date only if the plaintiff had served the defendant within the following sixty days.' Service
was not procured until after the sixty-day period.' Although Walker
admitted that his case would be barred in state court, he argued
against dismissal of the case by asserting that Rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governs commencement of actions in the
federal courts. 10 Under Rule 3, the action would have been commenced
with the filing of the complaint, which was within Oklahoma's two-year
statute of limitations period."
4. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL

1051 at 167

n.21 (1969).
5. 452 F. Supp. at 243. Walker's delay in service of process is not explained in the
record. Walker's counsel stated that the summons was discovered "in an unmarked folder
in the filing cabinet" in counsel's office about 90 days after the complaint had been filed.
446 U.S. at 742 n.2. The placing of the summons in the filing cabinet is unexplained. Id
6. 446 U.S. at 742.
7. Id. at 742-43. Walker filed his complaint within the applicable Oklahoma statute of
limitations, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 (1971), which runs two years commencing from the
date of the injury; however, he did not comply with the additional Oklahoma requirement,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971), that service of summons on a defendant is necessary for
the commencement of an action for purposes of tolling the Oklahoma statute of limitations. 446 U.S. at 742-43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971) provides in relevant part:
An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this article when the party faithfully, properly
and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed
by the first publication or service of the summons, or if service is sought to be procured by mailing, by a receipt of certified mail containing summons, within sixty
(60) days.
Id.
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 446 U.S. at 743.
10. Id. See note 4 supra. Walker argued that Rule 3 governs all aspects of the commencement of an action in federal court, including the tolling of the state statute of limitations. 446 U.S. at 743. He also argued that Armco should have relied on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41 which provides for dismissal for failure to prosecute, rather than on the
state statute of limitations. Armco replied that a Rule 41 argument was implicit in its motion to dismiss. Neither the district court nor the courts of appeals confronted this issue.
Id. at 743 at n.5.
11. 446 U.S. at 743. See note 4 supra.
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The issue facing the district court was whether, in a diversity action, state law or Rule 3 should govern the tolling of a state statute of
limitations. The district court concluded that because the tolling provision is an integral part of the Oklahoma statute of limitations, the
state provision must apply. Thus, the petitioner's complaint was barred
by the Oklahoma statute of limitations.12 The United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's decision in
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co.,

3

and affirmed the

Because of a conflict among the circuits,15 the
district court's
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
state law or Rule 3 controls the tolling of the state statute of limitations in a federal diversity action." The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals. 7
In delivering the opinion of a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall
noted that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction have often
been troubled with whether to apply state or federal law to matters
arising in a state-based cause of action. 8 The Supreme Court in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 9 established the rule that in diversity cases
decision.1

12. 452 F. Supp. at 245. The district court maintained that disregard of the Oklahoma
statute by a federal court would allow a plaintiff greater rights in a federal court than in
a state court. Id.
13. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). The Court in Ragan held that a tolling provision which is
an integral part of the state statute of limitations is a part of the state substantive law
and therefore must be applied in federal diversity actions. Id. at 533-34.
14. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d at 1133. The court of appeals maintained
that the Oklahoma tolling statute was unquestionably in direct conflict with Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held that Ragan was controlling because the
Oklahoma tolling statute was indistinguishable from the tolling statute in Ragan. The appeals court also noted that it was "constrained" to follow Ragan because Ragan had
originated in the Tenth Circuit and still was applied as the law of the Tenth Circuit. 592
F.2d at 1135-36.
15. Four circuit courts had held Ragan to be controlling and had upheld the application of state law to determine the commencement of an action. See Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979); Witherow v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 530
F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966). Two courts of appeal had upheld the
application of Rule 3 to determine the commencement of an action. See Ingram v. Kumar,
585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799
(6th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
16. 444 U.S. 823 (1979).
17. 446 U.S. at 744. The Supreme Court did not uphold the appeals court's contention
that there is a direct collision between Rule 3 and the Oklahoma tolling statute, but held
that Rule 3 and the Oklahoma tolling statute can co-exist. Id. at 752-53.
18. Id. at 744. See generally Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases,
11 Hous. L. REV. 791 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Leathers].
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie the Supreme Court decided that a federal diversity
court was required to apply the substantive state law, whether statutory or nonstatutory, to determine the duty of a railroad to a trespasser. Id.at 80. The Erie Court
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federal courts are required to apply the nonstatutory as well as the
statutory law of the forum state in matters of "general
jurisprudence."2 The Erie rule attempted to promote equal protection
of the laws for residents and non-residents, to secure uniformity in the
administration of state law, and to discourage forum-shopping.2
Justice Marshall next addressed the extension of Erie in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York.' The Supreme Court in York held that diversity actions at law, as well as in equity, are controlled by the Erie doctrine.
The York Court further determined that a statute of limitations is part
of the state cause of action, reasoning that a recovery based on application of the federal law, whether in an action at law or in equity, could
not be allowed if a state statute of limitations would have barred
recovery had the suit been brought in a state court.23 Justice Marshall
explained that the York Court followed the intent of Erie that the outcome in a diversity suit in federal court should not materially differ
from the result if the suit had been tried in a state court.24 He agreed
stated that federal courts in diversity cases cannot apply a general federal common law
merely because the state law is a non-statutory. IMLat 78. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which did not require federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the non-statutory law of the state, but permitted the federal courts to
develop a body of "general federal common law" as to matters of general jurisprudence.
304 U.S. at 78 n.18. Swift allowed widespread discrimination between residents and nonresidents because a non-resident could choose a state or federal forum based on which law
would afford him a better outcome. Although attempting to create uniformity of law, the
Swift doctrine prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the state. See
Note, Substance, Procedureand Uniformity-Recent Extensions of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 38 GEo. L.J. 115, 124-25 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Substance, Procedure and
Uniformity].
20. 446 U.S. at 744. Because the Erie Court did not set out definite criteria to differentiate state substantive law and state procedural law, federal judges faced problems
in characterizing the "substantive" law of the state. Substance, Procedureand Uniformity,
supra note 19, at 115-16.
21. 304 U.S. at 74-75.
22. 326 U.S. 99 (1945.
23. Id. at 110-12. See 446 U.S. at 745. Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Federal Equity Rules were controlling in suits in equity and federal
courts were not bound by state rules to determine when an action was commenced. "What
constituted the commencement of a federal equity suit was a matter wholly within the
federal equity practice and procedure and was not governed by the state statute of limitations or judicial decisions construing it." 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 3.07 at 3-86 n.4
(2d ed. 1980).
24. 446 U.S. at 745. The York Court did not apply the Erie "substance vs. procedure"
test in its pure form; instead, it established an "outcome-determinative" test, defining the
substantive laws of the states as those laws which would significantly affect the results of
a litigation if they were ignored by a federal court in a diversity case in equity or at law.
326 U.S. at 109-10. This refinement of the Erie doctrine was seen by some legal
authorities as a major step toward the destruction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey, and Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 494 (1949)
(doctrine of Swift v. Tyson promoted justice) [hereinafter cited as Keeffe]; Merrigan, Erie
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with the determination in York that the application of a state statute
of limitations in a federal diversity action depends on whether application of the state statute of limitations bears so vitally on a statecreated right as to determine the outcome of the case."
Justice Marshall reasoned that the Court in Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer and Warehouse Co.2" followed York by holding that state tolling
rules which are an integral part of the state statute of limitations are
"outcome-determinative," and therefore are binding on federal diversity
courtsY According to the Walker Court, Rule 3 cannot serve as a tolling
provision in a diversity case where a state statute of limitations has an
integral tolling provision.' The Court pointed out that the Ragan decision followed from Erie and York's policy that a state-created cause of
action cannot be given longer life in a federal court by applying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, there would be a different measure of a state-created right in a federal diversity court
than in a state court.?
to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1950)
(calculated risk for attorney to enter into diversity case; unpredictable when a federal rule
will be rejected on ground that it conflicts with substantive state law); 51 IOWA L. REV.
236, 238 (1965) (mechanical application of outcome-determination test has resulted in
uncertainty over application of federal rules).
25. 446 U.S. at 745. See generally Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal
Courts, 49 MICH. L. REV. 937 (1951) (detailed discussion of the federal courts and their application of statutes of limitations).
26. See note 13 supra.
27. 446 U.S. at 745-46. Because the service requirement was considered to be an
essential part of the state cause of action, the Ragan Court decided that the statute of
limitations was not tolled until the state statute's requirement of service within the
3.07, at
statutory period was met. 337 U.S. at 533-34. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
3-88 n.5 (2d ed. 1980) (cases from 1938 until the Ragan decision in 1949 held that Rule 3
commenced an action for purposes of tolling an applicable state statute of limitations);
Note, FederalRule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases,
20 STAN. L. REV. 1281 (1968) (Ragan undercuts the uniform rule followed since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, that Rule 3 commencement tolls the
applicable statutes of limitations).
28. 446 U.S. at 746. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 3 state in relevant part:
When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question
may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such as, service of the
summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal for service. The answer to
this question may depend on whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to
vary the operation of the statute of limitations. The requirements of Rule 4(a) that
the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a question arising.
FED. R. CIv. P. 3, 28 U.S.C. app. R. 3 (1976), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, note
4.
29. 446 U.S. at 746. Compare Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748-50
(1974) (Raganwrongly decided because Ragan Court did not consider that plaintiff did not
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The Court next discussed its decision in Hanna v. Plumer. The
Hanna Court held that in a civil diversity action Federal Rule 4(d)(1), 1
rather than state law, 32 governs the manner in which process is to be
served.3 Justice Marshall noted that Hanna limited the "outcomedeterminative" test of Erie and York by requiring that it be read with
attention to the twin evils which Erie sought to prevent, forumshopping and inequitable administration of the laws.Y He explained
have the opportunities to protect himself against possibility that service would not be
effectuated in time in the federal procedural system that he would have had in state procedural system; solution is a total recourse to federal practice) with Ely, The Necklace, 87
HARv. L. REV. 753, 756-58 (1974) (Ragan was correctly decided because a total recourse to
federal practice, displacing the state tolling statute, would take from the defendant a
right that the statute sought to give him).
30. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
31. Rule 4(d)(1) provides:
[Service of process shall be made upon] an individual other than an infant or an
incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
32. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958). The Massachusetts statute
at issue in Hanna did not require an executor or administrator to answer to an action by a
creditor of the deceased unless the writ was served by in-hand delivery to the proper
representative or a properly executed notice was filed in the appropriate registry of probate. Id. See 380 U.S. at 462.
33. 380 U.S. at 463-64.
34. 446 U.S. at 747. See 380 U.S. at 468. If the Hanna .Court had applied the pure
"outcome-determinative" test, the Court would have discovered that after service has
been made under Rule 4(d)(1), the choice between the state law or the federal rule has a
substantial effect on the outcome because once litigation has begun, nearly every procedural variation can be considered "outcome-determinative."
In Hanna the Court was not confronted with a problem of forum-shopping because the
plaintiff did not bring suit in federal court to avoid a state court rule with which he was
unable to comply. Application of the state rule would have merely changed the manner in
which process was served. Furthermore, the difference between service being made "inhand" or being left at a defendant's abode with a responsible adult would not be so
substantial as to raise equal protection problems. 380 U.S. at 468-69, cited in 446 U.S. at
747.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna, stated that the majority misconceived
the constitutional premises of Erie in exalting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over
any other law and in stating that Erie's main purpose is to discourage forum-shopping.
380 U.S. at 474, 478 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan pointed out that Erie's
primary purpose is to prevent usurpation of states' powers and to protect the rights of
nondiverse local parties by the prevention of forum-shopping. Id. at 474-75 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan proposed that the applicable test for diversity characterization
is not the Hanna test, but a test which would take into consideration whether the choice
of law would substantially affect "those primary decisions respecting human conduct
which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation." Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concur-
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that the Hanna Court held that where a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is plainly applicable, the test as to whether a federal rule is
controlling is not the Erie doctrine, but whether the federal rule is
within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act 35 and within a constitutional grant of power.3
The Walker Court recognized that the case before them was factually
indistinguishable from Ragan.7 Therefore, the state statute of limitaring). See Stason, Choice of Law Within the FederalSystem: Erie Versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377, 400-01 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Stason].
35. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (1976)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted by the Supreme Court
under the authority granted in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. The Act gave the
Supreme Court "the power to prescribe, by general rules, for district courts ... the practice and procedure in civil actions at law," provided, however, that the "rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." Id. See Note,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the FederalRules, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1030-31 (1949).
Even though a federal rule may be classified as procedural, the rule may still deny
rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments or rights guaranteed under the equal
protection clause. If a procedural rule violates a right guaranteed under the first eight
amendments, such as due process, it is unconstitutional. Similarly, if the federal rule is so
different from the appropriate state procedure that it results in grave discrimination
against citizens of the state in favor of non-citizens, it is unconstitutional as a violation of
the equal protection clause. 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 345, 350-51 (1966).
36. 446 U.S. at 748. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 471. The supremacy clause of
the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, demands the subserviance of state law when a
conflict arises between state law and a federal constitutional provision, treaty, or statute
which is precisely on point. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78.
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941), the Supreme Court stated that if the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act and do
not exceed constitutional limitations, they would have the force of a federal statute. See
51 CORNELL L.Q. 551, 551 n.5 (1966). But see Stason, supra note 34, at 398-405 (Hanna
resulted in an unconstitutional and undesirable result because the Court's application of a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to an issue which admittedly can be classified as either
"substantive" or "procedural" failed to consider the incidental "substantive" effect the
federal rule would have on the rights of the parties, thereby thwarting diversity jurisdiction's essential purpose of securing state-created rights in federal courts); 37 MIsSOURI L.
REV. 734, 738-39 (1972) (mechanical testing fails to analyze sufficiently whether Rule 3 really
abridges substantive rights and fails to consider the state's interest in establishing rules
for the commencement of an action).
37. 446 U.S. at 748. The Kansas tolling statute, KAN. GEN. STATS. 1935 § 60-308, in
Ragan and the Oklahoma tolling statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971), in Walker are
indistinguishable because both provide that an attempt to commence an action is
equivalent to actual commencement of the action if the petitioner acts with due diligence
and serves the defendant within 60 days after the statute of limitations has run. In both
Ragan and Walker the state service requirement necessary to toll the state statute of
limitations was determined to be an integral part of the state statute of limitations, which
could not be displaced by Rule 3. In addition, in Ragan and Walker service of process was
not effectuated until after the two-year statute of limitations and the 60-day service
period had run. Accordingly, the Walker Court noted that both cases would have been
barred in the applicable state court. 446 U.S. at 748.
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tions must be applied to bar the action unless Ragan was no longer
good law." Relying on stare decisis39 and the limits of the Hanna decision, 0 the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that Hanna overruled Ragan."'Justice Marshall stated that the Hanna analysis applies
only when there is a direct collision between the federal rule and the
state law. Thus, according to Justice Marshall, the Court in Hanna
distinguished, rather than overruled Ragan." Only if the plain meaning
of a federal rule is sufficiently broad to cover the issue before the Court
will the Court apply the Hanna analysis." Justice Marshall determined
38. Id. at 749. Some courts have asserted that the Hanna decision weakened the
authority of the Ragan decision. See, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1973), cert
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974). See also Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Diversity
Cases: For Whom the Statute Tolls, 10 CALIF. W.L. REv. 140, 140-42 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as For Whom the Statute Tolls].
39. 446 U.S. at 749. The Walker Court stated that although stare decisis is not an absolute doctrine which commands that earlier decisions should never be overturned, caution should be used in rejecting established law. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's
reasons for overruling Ragan were identical to those which the Hanna Court utilized to
uphold the validity of Ragan. Thus, because the petitioner was asking the Court to reconsider two prior decisions, he was faced with a heavy burden to support such a change in
established law. The Court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet this burden. Id.
40. 380 U.S. at 472. See 446 U.S. at 749. Hanna limited its "direct collision" test to
cases where the state law and the federal rule are in a direct collision. Hanna also allowed
the Ragan analysis to co-exist with the "direct collision" test by stating that "this Court
has never before been confronted with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in
direct collision with the law of the relevant State .... " 380 U.S. at 472. See 446 U.S. at
748 n.7.
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Hanna,maintained that the holding was much
too broad. He stated that so much overriding force had been attributed to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that it was difficult to envision a case where a conflicting state
rule would be allowed to operate. Justice Harlan reasoned that, under Hanna, a federal
rule would prevail even though a state rule may reflect policy considerations, which,
under Erie, would fall within the sphere of state legislative authority. 380 U.S. at 478
(Harlan, J., concurring).
41. 446 U.S. at 749. The petitioner contended that Hanna overruled Ragan because
the state statute of limitations in Ragan was in direct conflict with Rule 3. Relying on
Hanna, petitioner asserted that the appropriate question was whether Rule 3 was within
the scope of the Rules Enabling Act and within the constitutional power of Congress. The
petitioner concluded that, unless Rule 3 violated one of these two restrictions, it should be
applied. 446 U.S. at 749. In his concurring opinion in Hanna, Justice Harlan concluded
that Ragan was no longer controlling. 380 U.S. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. 446 U.S. at 749-50.
43. Id. In construing the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Walker
Court noted that the federal rule should not be narrowly construed in order to avoid a
direct collision with state law. The Court advocated a plain meaning approach to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the Hanna "direct collision"
analysis applies. Id. at 750 n.9. Some legal authorities have argued that Ragan is no
longer controlling because the scope of Rule 3 is broad enough to be in direct conflict with
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that Rule 3 is not in direct conflict with the state law in Walker
because Rule 3 gives no indication that its intent is to toll a statute of
limitations." The language of Rule 3 nowhere explicitly provides a tolling provision.45 Relying on the "plain meaning" of Rule 3, then, the
Court found that in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date from
which various timing requirements of the federal rules run, 8 but does
not affect state statutes of limitations."'
The Court reasoned that in contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma tolling
statute" represents a substantive decision by the state that actual service on the defendant is an integral part of the policies served by the
statute of limitations. 9 These policies provide for an end to litigation
the state tolling statute in Ragan. They conclude that the Hanna test is required. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884, 893 (1965);
Stason, supra note 34, at 403.
44. 446 U.S. at 750. See note 28 supra. Before Ragan, the federal courts interpreted
Rule 3 as controlling the tolling of the statute of limitations in diversity actions as well as
in purely federal actions. See, e.g., Kessler v. Fleming, 163 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1947);
Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Isaacks v.
Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cr.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781 (1944); Reynolds v. Needle,
132 F.2d 161, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568, 569-70 (E.D.N.Y.
1939). After Ragan, Rule 3 has continued to control the tolling of the statute of limitations
in nondiversity federal actions. See, e.g., Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline
Co., 347 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925 (1966); Badillo v. Central
Steel and Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299, 302-04 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Triplett v. Azordegan, 478 F.
Supp. 872, 878-79 (N.D. Iowa 1977). See Note, Amending the Rules of Civil Procedure
After Hanna v. Plumer: Rule 3, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1139, 1144 (1967).
45. 446 U.S. at 750. See note 4 supra. The Walker Court noted that the Advisory
Committee had predicted that under Rule 3 a question could arise as to whether the mere
filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute of limitations or whether further
action is required. See note 28 supra. The Court stated that this does not mean that the
Advisory Committee intended Rule 3 to act as a tolling provision for statutes of limitation
but that the Advisory Committee believed that Rule 3 might have that effect. 446 U.S. at
750 n.10. One commentator has stated, "It would seem, however, that the filing of the
complaint conditionally suspends the running of the Statute of Limitations, provided the
summons is issued forthwith and served within a reasonable time thereafter." Rotwein,
Pleading and Practice Under the New Federal Rules-A Survey and Comparison, 8
BROOKLYN L. REV. 188, 193 (1938).

46. 446 U.S. at 751. Rule 3 controls the timing requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, such as the interposition of compulsory counterclaims, discovery under
Rules 26(a) and 33, summary judgment under Rule 56(a), and two actions on the same
claim. W. BARREN & A. HOLTZOFF. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 162 (C. Wright ed.
1960).
47. 446 U.S. at 751.
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971). See note 7 supra. The Oklahoma statute of limitations scheme stresses the importance of actual service and notice to each defendant.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971). See 446 U.S. at 751-52 n.12.

49. 446 U.S. at 751. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the mere filing of a
lawsuit does not commence an action for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations
because the purpose of statutes of limitation is to give a defendant sufficient notice to
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so that there is a time when a defendant may have peace of mind and
is not required to put together a defense to an old claim. ° According to
the Court, these policy considerations make the service requirement an
integral part of the statute of limitations, both in this case and in
Ragan." The Court found that because the scope of Rule 3 is not broad
enough to displace substantive Oklahoma state policies, the Oklahoma
tolling statute and Rule 3 can co-exist, each limited to its own sphere
of coverage."
Finding no direct conflict between Rule 3 and the Oklahoma tolling
statute, the Court saw Hanna as inapplicable.' Instead, the policies of
Erie and Ragan control.' The Court recognized that although application of Rule 3 in Walker might not encourage forum-shopping," its apadequately prepare his defense. C & C Tile Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 7, 503
P.2d 554, 555 (Okla. 1972). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also stated that a statute of
limitations is a statute of repose whose purpose is to run against those who are neglectful
of their rights and who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in enforcing them.
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1962).
The Walker Court pointed out that, although OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 151 (1971) provides
that "[a] civil action is deemed commenced by filing in the office of the court clerk of the
proper court a petition and by the clerk's issuance of summons thereon," section 97, not
section 151, controls the commencement of an action for statutes of limitations purposes.
446 U.S. at 752 n.13. Section 97 qualifies section 151 because section 97 represents a
substantive decision by Oklahoma that the "timely" commencement of an action is assured
only when the plaintiff diligently attempts to make service and makes service of the summons within 60 days. See Tyler v. Taylor, 578 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Okla. App. 1977). Section 97
is employed when there is a question under Oklahoma law as to whether summons is
"timely" served. Id. The Walker Court concluded that because section 97 and section 151
can both be applied in state court, each for a separate purpose, Rule 3 and section 97 can
both be applied in a diversity action. 446 U.S. at 752 n.13.
50. 446 U.S. at 751.
51. Id. at 751-52. The Court in York reasoned that statutes of limitation are a part of
the state substantive law because they have a significant effect on whether there will be a
recovery on a state-created right. Because statutes of limitation bear so vitally on a statecreated right, the York Court concluded that a federal court in a diversity case should apply them. 326 U.S. at 110-11.
52. 446 U.S. at 751-52.
53. Id. at 752. In limiting its holding to cases where there is no Hanna "direct collision" between state law and a federal rule, the Walker Court found no reason to address
whether Rule 3 is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act and within a grant of constitutional power. Id. at 752 n.14. See Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV.
693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
54. 446 U.S. at 752-53. The essential policies underlying Erie and Ragan are
discouragement of forum-shopping, avoidance of the inequitable administration of justice,
and promotion of uniformity in the administration of state law. Id. at 746-47, 753. See
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. at 532; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. at 74-75.
55. 446 U.S. at 753. The Walker Court noted that there is no indication that when
the petitioner filed his suit in federal court he had any reason to believe that he would
avoid the state service requirement. He was not confronted with a situation where
adherence to the state rule would have absolutely barred recovery. Id. at 753 n.15.
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plication would result in an inequitable administration of justice
because it would give a state-created cause of action longer life in a
diversity action in federal court than in a state court.' The Court concluded that in the absence of a controlling federal rule, a state-based
cause of action that is barred in the state court by the state statute of
limitations should not be allowed to proceed to judgment in a federal
court merely because of the fortuity of diversity of citizenship. Such a
distinction between state and federal plaintiffs cannot be supported by
the policies underlying diversity jurisdiction."
Walker is the Supreme Court's most recent determination of the
applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases
when a federal rule differs from the accepted state law. The Supreme
Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins established that in federal diversity
cases, a federal court must apply the substantive laws of the forum
state;" leaving procedural matters subject to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The question facing the Court after Erie was whether a
matter should be characterized as substantive or procedural and,
accordingly, whether a federal rule or state law should control.5
56. Id. at 753.
57. Id.
58. 304 U.S. at 78. See note 19 and text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. The Erie
Court reached this conclusion by interpreting section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides: "That: the laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)).
Legal authorities have developed varying interpretations of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Compare Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARv. L. REV. 49, 51, 52 (1923) (the word "laws" had been inserted into final version of
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to replace the phrase "the Statute laws of the
" as a matter of form rather
several states ... and their unwritten and common law ..
than as a substantive alteration of the text); Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1686-87 (1974) (courts do not have power to
displace state social policies in areas of state competence; therefore, courts must broadly
construe section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789); Stason, supra note 34, at 386-87 (Erie interpretation of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 has a constitutional basis found in
Erie's underlying policies of intrastate uniformity of result in actions based on statecreated rights and in prevention of discrimination against parties unable to claim diversity
jurisdiction); with Keeffe, supra note 24, at 496 (Swift v. Tyson was not unconstitutional;
Erie Court had preconceived notion to abolish an undesirable judicial policy, when convenient, whether or not weight of authority at time of decision suported such decision).
59. See Substance, Procedure and Uniformity, supra note 19, at 115-16. The Erie
Court did not formulate clear criteria to distinguish between state substantive law and
state procedural law. After Erie, courts relied on the abstract characterizations of
substance and procedure established in conflict of laws or similar fields where the
substantive-procedural dichotomy had been utilized. The Erie policy did not control the
interpretation of the law, but was merely a factor to be considered together with the
established abstract characterizations of substance and procedure. Id.
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In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York the Supreme Court had to decide between application of the state statute of limitations which would have
barred recovery, and application of federal law which would have
given the state-created cause of action a longer life. 0 In resolving this
issue, the York Court did not characterize the statute of limitations as
substantive or procedural. Instead, the York Court developed an
"outcome-determinative" test which required that the result in federal
court be identical to the result in state court had the suit been initiated there." Accordingly, the York Court held that if the applicable
state statute of limitations were ignored in federal court, uniformity of
result between state courts and a federal diversity court sitting within
the forum state would be thwarted.2
The York decision was interpreted in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co. to command that not only must a federal diversity
court apply state substantive law, but that it must also qualify or limit
a state-created action when the local law so directs." The Supreme
Court in Ragan determined that state tolling rules are controlling in
federal diversity actions because application of Rule 3 would be
"outcome-determinative."" The Ragan Court noted that in certain instances tolling provisions are an integral part of the state statute of
limitations. 5 Again the Court did not characterize either a statute of
60. 326 U.S. at 109-10. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
61. Id. at 108-09. See note 24 supra. The York Court reasoned that the "outcomedeterminative" test promoted Erie's policy of insuring that where a federal court is exercising diversity jurisdiction, the outcome is the same as it would be if tried in a state
court. The York Court stated that a "mechanical" Erie "substance vs. procedure" test
would have led to unreasoned distinctions between "substance" and "procedure." 326 U.S.
at 109.
York's "outcome-determinative" test has been criticized as being too broad to determine whether state law or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is controlling in a diversity
action. Dissenting in York, Justice Rutledge stated: "It is exactly in this borderland,
where procedural or remedial rights may or may not have the effect of determining the
substantive ones completely, that caution is required in extending the rule of the Erie
case by the very rule itself." Id. at 115 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 108-09.
63. 337 U.S. at 532-33.
64. Id. Although the case could have been resolved by merely employing the
"outcome-determinative" test, the Court also affirmed the lower court's determination
that the tolling provision was an "integral" part of the state statute of limitations. Several
cases have relied on Ragan to determine that even where the state tolling provision is not
an integral part of the state statute of limitations, application of Rule 3 rather than the
state tolling provision is outcome-determinative. See, e.g., Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d
638 (8th Cir. 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399
(W.D. La. 1970); Gatliff v. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970).
See also For whom the Statute Tolls, supra note 38, at 138.
65. 337 U.S. at 532.
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limitations or a tolling provision as substantive or procedural. The
Court merely decided that a federal court sitting in a diversity case
could not ignore a state statute that would lead to a different result in
federal court than in a state court. The Ragan Court reasoned that to
do otherwise would conflict with the goals of Erie and York.6"
In the aftermath of Ragan, federal courts differed in their interpretation of whether a state statute of limitations with a tolling provision usurps a tolling provision implicit in Rule 3. Some courts distinguished Ragan by reasoning that if the state tolling provision is not an
integral part of the state statute of limitations, Rule 3 is applicable in
a federal diversity action." Other courts maintained that Rule 3 always
acts as a tolling provision, and therefore is controlling in diversity actions.' Still others followed Ragan on the basis that the non-application
of state tolling rules in a federal diversity action is outcome-

determinative.69
A shift away from the outcome-determinative test was first evidenced
by the Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative."
The Byrd Court decided that a trial by jury to resolve disputed factual
questions was an essential federal policy which did not infringe on a
state right so substantially as to require application of the state law. '
A state court had held that the issue of immunity should be decided by
a judge and not a jury.72 The respondent contended that under Erie
the federal court must apply this state holding to assure that the statecreated immunity will be granted uniformly." The Byrd Court rejected
66. Id. See note 29 supra.
67. See, e.g., Reisinger v. Cannon, 127 F. Supp. 50 (D. Conn. 1954); Glebus v.
Fillmore, 104 F. Supp. 902 (D.Conn. 1952).
68. See, e.g., Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956); Hukill v. Pacific and Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 159 F. Supp. 571 (D.Alas. 1958); Wagner v. New York 0. & W. Ry.,
146 F. Supp. 926 (M.D. Pa. 1956); Lopez v. Resort Airlines, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 37 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
69. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Smith, 286 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1961); Ziegler v. Akin, 261
F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1958); Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1957);
Byrd v. Bates, 243 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1957); Doyle v. Moylan, 141 F. Supp. 95 (D.Mass.
1956).
70. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See Stason, supra note 34, at 392-94 (Byrd's "policy-balancing"
test undercut Erie policy of uniformity and violated tenth amendment's command that
rights created under powers reserved to states cannot be infringed by application of
federal "procedural" law in diversity actions-"a step in the direction of federal power
taken at the expense of federalism").
71. 356 U.S. at 540. The Byrd Court maintained that an essential feature of the
federal system is the distribution of trial functions between judge and jury and the
assignment of disputed factual questions to the jury under the command of the seventh
amendment. Id. at 537. The state interest involved in Byrd was the policy of achieving the
uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations. Id. at 538.
72. ; Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 543, 96 S.E.2d 566, 571-72 (1957).
73. 356 U.S. at 534.
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this contention, reasoning that even though a jury determination of the
issue may substantially affect the outcome of the case, the York test
does not invariably
prevail when there are affirmative, countervailing
74
federal concerns.
In Hanna v. Plumer the Supreme Court determined that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are immune from attack as outcomedeterminative.7 5 The Hanna Court reasoned that because a federal rule
is rationally capable of characterization as procedural, the matter is
within the power of Congress and the federal courts to regulate.78 The
Hanna Court noted, however, that when the scope of the federal rule is
not broad enough to cover the 77matter in question, Erie mandates the
application of the state statute.
Subsequent to Hanna, courts of appeals reached different conclusions about when the statute of limitations is tolled in a diversity action. Several courts followed Ragan, deciding that state statutes and
not the provision of Rule 3 govern when the statute of limitations is
tolled. 7 In other circuits, courts decided that Rule 3 governs, disregarding any application of the Hanna Court's holding that the scope
of Rule 3 is not broad enough to serve as a tolling provision. 9 Courts
applying Rule 3 reasoned that the decision as to the commencement of
an action is not related to the substantive issues of the case, but is
only a procedural question which determines whether an action is to
continue.'
74. Id. at 536-37. The Byrd Court turned away from the rather simple view of York
that federal diversity courts should apply state rules when the application of the federal
rule would change the result in federal court from that in a state court. See Leathers,
supra note 18, at 812.
75. 380 U.S. at 466-67. See note 34 and text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
76. 380 U.S. at 471. But see Stason, supra note 34, at 402. Stason asserts that in the
"grey" area, where matters are rationally capable of being classified as substantive or
procedural, courts have always determined the characterization in a meaningful way.
Stason argues that the Hanna test does not set a responsible guide for classification
within the "grey" areas, but merely states that where an appropriate characterization is
difficult, the federal rule will be applied, even at the expense of constitutional guarantees.
Id.
77. 380 U.S. at 470.
78. See, e.g., Rose v. K.K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1979);
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 740 (1980);
Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979); Witherow v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966).
79. See, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974);
Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
80. See Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d at 568-69; Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d at 801-04;
Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d at 604-06.
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The Court's discussion in Walker has revived Ragan without abandoning the Hanna analysis. The Court has recognized that the two
lines of analysis can co-exist, each in its own sphere of influence."1 The
test in Hanna assures that application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will not be subject to challenge by state rules when the
plain meaning of the federal rule is specifically on point.' But where a
conflict exists between a state rule and a federal rule not specifically
on point, the Walker analysis has revitalized the "characterization"
test of Erie,3 the "outcome-determination" test of York," and an examination of the effect of a non-application of the state law on the twin
aims of Erie as required by Hanna.5 In the Walker analysis none of
these tests appears to be controlling.
In previous cases problems have arisen when a single test was used
as the sole criterion for determining whether state or federal law was
controlling in a diversity action. "Grey" areas resulted where a matter
could not be clearly "characterized" by the Erie test as substantive or
procedural. In these "grey" areas there was no clear guidance for the
courts as to how to characterize a matter."" The result was that matters within the "grey" area were usually characterized by the courts
as a part of the state law.87 Exclusive use of the York outcomedetermination test creates the problem that at a certain stage in a
judicial proceeding any procedural matter can be classified as outcomedeterminative. 8 The Walker Court organized these tests in such a way
as to give them a new legitimacy.
81. 446 U.S. at 752.
82. 380 U.S. at 471.
83. See 446 U.S. at 751-52. See notes 19-20, 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 446 U.S. at 753. See notes 24 and 61 and text accompanying notes 22-25, 60-62
supra.
85. 446 U.S. at 752-53. See 380 U.S. at 468. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
86. See Ely, supra note 53, at 724-27; Keeffe, supra note 24, at 506-08, 514-20, 524-27;
Leathers, supra note 18, at 793; Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw' Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L.
Puv. 797, 810-34 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin]; Siegel, The FederalRules in Diversity Cases: Erie Implemented, Not Retarded, 54 A.B.A. J. 172, 172-76 (1968); Stason,
supra note 34, at 378-80, 383-84, 390-92.
87. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 108-12 (1945); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210-13 (1939);
Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205-09 (1938); Montgomery v. Hutchins, 118 F.2d
661, 664-66 (9th Cir. 1941); Beagle v. Northern Pacific R.R., 32 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Wash.
1940); Ross v. Service Lines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Ill.
1940); Thompson v.
Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270, 271-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), affd sub nom, Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d
631, 632-34 (2d Cir. 1942). See Keeffe, supra note 24, at 506-08, 520, 525-26; Mishkin, supra
note 86, at 810-34.
88. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 468-74; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop.,
356 U.S. at 536-40; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949);
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The Court's determination that the service requirement was an "integral" part of the state statute of limitations is a crucial part of its
analysis because it allowed the Court to characterize the service
requirement as substantive. The first time the Supreme Court applied
the "integral" part test to a dispute between state law and a federal
rule not directly on point was in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and
Warehouse Co.89 In Ragan the Supreme Court did not explain the
meaning of "integral." The Ragan Court merely adopted the court of
appeals' determination that the service requirement was an integral
part of the state statute of limitations." However, the court of appeals
decision did not clearly define the specific considerations underlying
the integral part test. The Walker Court's integral part analysis more
clearly defined the integral part test by emphasizing the state policies
underlying the service requirement. 1 Because the state service requirement promoted the same policies as the statute of limitations, the
service requirement was determined to be an "integral" part of the
state statute of limitations.2 As future courts apply the "integral" part
test to characterize a state service requirement as substantive, the
test will be further defined. Following the Walker rationale, each court
will have to look to the state policies underlying the state serice requirement to determine whether the service requirement is an "integral" part of the state statute of limitaitons In the absence of state
court decisions explaining the policies underlying the state service requirement, a court will have to decide whether the state service requirement promotes the same policies as the statute of limitations.
These courts may find it necessary to more clearly define what is "integral" by determining whether the service requirement is located
within the same statutory scheme or is in some other way intimately
connected with the state statute of limitations. 4 Future courts may
also extend the "integral" part test to characterize other state laws as
substantive.
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 536-38 (1949). See Ely, supra note 53, at 709;
Leathers, supra note 18, at 793-94, 801-04, 815-17; Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A
Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717-28 (1950); For whom the
Statute Tolls, supra note 38, at 139; Note, Pleading-Commencementof a Diversity Action
for Statutes of Limitations Purposes, 37 Miss. L. REv. 734, 738-39 (1972); 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
345, 351 (1966).
89. 337 U.S. at 532, 534. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. at 536-37.
90. 337 U.S. at 532, 534. See Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170
F.2d 987, 991-93 (1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
91. 446 U.S. at 751-52.
92. Id. at 751. See text accompanying notes 12-17, 26-29, 51 supra.
93. 446 U.S. at 751-52. See notes 48-49 and text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
94. See, e.g., Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974); Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446, 448-51 (10th Cir.
1971).
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In resolving a conflict between Rule 3 and a state tolling statute, the
Walker Court utilized the Erie characterization test, the York
outcome-determination test, and Hanna's limitation of the application
of the outcome-determination test by a consideration of the twin aims
of Erie. The Walker Court also further discussed the "integral" part
test of Ragan, looking to the policies of the tolling provision to determine if it was an integral part of the statute of limitations. Because the
Court based its decision on a determination that Ragan was controlling, it did not need to discuss extensively the application of the tests
to the facts. Only future decisions will clarify the relationship of these
tests.
Pamela J. Zepka

